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Abstract—The q-composite key predistribution scheme [1]
is used prevalently for secure communications in large-scale
wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Prior work [2]–[4] explores
topological properties of WSNs employing the q-composite
scheme for q = 1 with unreliable communication links modeled
as independent on/off channels. In this paper, we investigate
topological properties related to the node degree in WSNs
operating under the q-composite scheme and the on/off channel
model. Our results apply to general q and are stronger than
those reported for the node degree in prior work even for the
case of q being 1. Specifically, we show that the number of nodes
with certain degree is asymptotically equivalent in distribution
to a Poisson random variable, present the asymptotic probability
distribution for the minimum degree of the network, and establish
the asymptotically exact probability for the property that the
minimum degree is at least an arbitrary value. Numerical
experiments confirm the validity of our analytical findings.
Index Terms—Random intersection graph, random key graph,
s-intersection graph, connectivity, node degree, key predistribu-
tion, wireless sensor network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The basic key predistribution scheme of Eschenauer and
Gligor [5] has been recognized as a typical solution to se-
cure communication in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and
studied extensively in the literature over the last decade [1]–
[11]. The idea is that cryptographic keys are assigned before
deployment to ensure secure sensor-to-sensor communications.
The q-composite key predistribution scheme proposed by
Chan et al. [1] as an extension of the basic Eschenauer–Gligor
scheme [5] (the q-composite scheme in the case of q = 1) has
received much interest [7], [18]–[23] since its introduction.
The q-composite scheme works as follows. For a WSN with
n sensors, prior to deployment, each sensor is independently
assigned Kn different keys which are selected uniformly at
random from a pool of Pn keys. Then two sensors establish
a secure link in between after deployment if and only if
they share at least q key(s) and the physical link constraint
between them is satisfied. Pn and Kn are both functions of
n for generality, with the natural condition 1 ≤ Kn ≤ Pn.
Examples of physical link constraints include the reliability of
the transmission channel and the distance between two sensors
close enough for communication. The q-composite scheme
with q ≥ 2 outperforms the basic Eschenauer–Gligor scheme
with q = 1 in terms of the strength against small-scale network
capture attacks while trading off increased vulnerability in the
face of large-scale attacks [1].
In this paper, we investigate topological properties related
to node1 degree in WSNs employing the q-composite key
predistribution scheme with general q under the on/off channel
model as the physical link constraint comprising independent
channels which are either on or off. The degree of a node
v is the number of nodes having secure links with v; and
the minimum (node) degree of a network is the least among
the degrees of all nodes. Specifically, we demonstrate that the
number of nodes with certain degree is asymptotically equiva-
lent in distribution to a Poisson random variable, establish the
asymptotic probability distribution for the minimum degree of
the network, and derive the asymptotically exact probability
for the property that the minimum degree is no less than an
arbitrary value. Yag˘an [2] and we [3], [4] consider the WSNs
with q = 1 and show results for several topological properties,
yet results about node degree in these prior work are weaker
than our analytical findings even when the general q is set as
1.
Our approach to the analysis is to explore the induced
random graph models of the WSNs. As will be clear in Section
II, the graph modeling a WSN under the q-composite scheme
and the on/off channel model is an intersection of two distinct
types of random graphs. It is the intertwining [2], [34], [36],
[39] of these two graphs that makes our analysis challenging.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section II
describes the system model in detail. Afterwards, we present
and discuss the results in Section III. Subsequently, we provide
numerical experiments in Section IV to confirm our analytical
results, whereas Section V is devoted to relevant results in
the literature. Next, we conclude the paper and identify future
research directions in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We elaborate the graph modeling of a WSN with n sensors,
which employs the q-composite key predistribution scheme
and works under the on/off channel model. We use a node
set V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} to represent the n sensors. For each
node vi ∈ V , the set of its Kn different keys is denoted by
Si, which is uniformly distributed among all Kn-size subsets
of a key pool of Pn keys.
1A sensor is also referred to as a node.
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The q-composite key predistribution scheme is modeled by
a uniform q-intersection graph denoted by2 Gq(n,Kn, Pn),
which is defined on the node set V such that any two distinct
nodes vi and vj sharing at least q key(s) (an event denoted
by Γij ) have an edge in between. Clearly, Γij equals event[
|Si ∩ Sj | ≥ q
]
, where |A| with A as a set means the
cardinality of A.
Under the on/off channel model, each node-to-node channel
is independently on with probability pn and off with probabil-
ity (1 − pn), where pn is a function of n with 0 < pn ≤ 1.
Denoting by Cij the event that the channel between distinct
nodes vi and vj is on, we have P [Cij ] = pn, where P[E ]
denotes the probability that event E happens, throughout the
paper. The on/off channel model is represented by an Erdo˝s-
Rényi graph G(n, pn) [52] defined on the node set V such
that vi and vj have an edge in between if event Cij occurs.
Finally, we denote by Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) the underlying
graph of the n-node WSN operating under the q-composite key
predistribution scheme and the on/off channel model. We often
write Gq rather than Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) for notation brevity.
Graph Gq is defined on the node set V such that there exists
an edge between nodes vi and vj if and only if events Γij and
Cij happen at the same time. We set event Eij := Γij ∩ Cij .
Then Gq can be seen as the intersection of Gq(n,Kn, Pn) and
G(n, pn), i.e.,
Gq = Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩G(n, pn).
We define ps,q as the probability that two different nodes
share at least q key(s) and pe,q as the probability that two
distinct nodes have a secure link in Gq . Clearly, ps,q and pe,q
are the edge probabilities in graphs Gq(n,Kn, Pn) and Gq,
respectively. ps,q and pe,q both depend on Kn, Pn and q, while
pe,q also depends on pn. By definition, ps,q is determined
through
ps,q = P[Γij ] =
Kn∑
u=q
P[|Si ∩ Sj| = u], (1)
where it is shown [6], [7] that
P[|Si ∩ Sj | = u]
=


(Knu )(
Pn−Kn
Kn−u
)
(PnKn)
, for max{0, 2Kn − Pn} ≤ u ≤ Kn,
0, otherwise.
(2)
From Eij = Γij ∩ Cij and the independence of Cij and Γij ,
we obtain
pe,q = P[Eij ] = P[Cij ] · P[Γij ] = pn · ps,q. (3)
2Many papers [7], [18]–[23] in the literature use s instead of q so we have
uniform s-intersection graph Gs(n,Kn, Pn). This work uses q following the
q-composite key predistribution scheme [1].
III. THE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We present and discuss our results in this section. Through-
out the paper, q is an arbitrary positive integer and does
not scale with n; e is the base of the natural logarithm
function, ln. All limits are understood with n → ∞. We use
the standard asymptotic notation o(·), ω(·), O(·),Θ(·),∼. In
particular, for two sequences fn and gn, fn ∼ gn signifies
limn→∞(fn/gn) = 1; namely, fn and gn are asymptotically
equivalent.
A. Results of Graph Gq
We detail the results of graph Gq in Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1 below. The detailed proofs of Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1 can be found in the full version [6] and are omitted
here owing to the space limitation. The basic idea is to use
the method of moments [44].
Theorem 1. For graph Gq under Kn = ω(1) and Kn
2
Pn
=
o(1), the following properties (a) and (b) hold.
(a) If
pe,q = Θ
(
lnn
n
)
, (4)
then for h = 0, 1, 2, . . ., it follows that φh denoting the
number of nodes with degree h, is asymptotically equivalent in
distribution to a Poisson random variable with mean λn,h :=
n(h!)−1(npe,q)
he−npe,q . In other words, with Po(λn,h) denot-
ing a Poisson random variable with mean λn,h, it holds that
P[φh = i] ∼ P[Po(λn,h) = i], for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
(b) If for some integer ℓ and some sequence αn satisfying
−1 < lim inf
n→∞
αn
ln lnn
≤ lim sup
n→∞
αn
ln lnn
< 1,
it holds that
pe,q =
lnn+ (ℓ− 1) ln lnn+ αn
n
, (5)
then defining δ as the minimum degree of Gq, we obtain:
for ℓ ≤ 0, it follows that as n→∞,{
δ = 0 with a probability approaching to 1,
δ > 0 with a probability going to 0;
and for ℓ > 0, properties (b1)–(b4) below hold.
(b1) (δ 6= ℓ) ∩ (δ 6= ℓ − 1) with a probability going to 0 as
n→∞;
(b2) if lim
n→∞
αn = α
∗ ∈ (−∞,∞), then as n→∞,

δ = ℓ with a probability converging to e
−
e−α
∗
(k−1)! ,
δ = ℓ− 1 with a probability tending to
(
1−e−
e−α
∗
(k−1)!
)
;
(b3) if lim
n→∞
αn = ∞, then as n→∞,{
δ = ℓ with a probability approaching to 1,
δ 6= ℓ with a probability going to 0;
and
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(b4) if lim
n→∞
αn = −∞, then as n→∞,{
δ = ℓ− 1 with a probability tending to 1,
δ 6= ℓ− 1 with a probability converging to 0.
Remark 1. Property (b) of Theorem 1 presents the asymptotic
probability distribution for the minimum degree of the network.
We present a corollary of Theorem 1 below. The corollary
is established with the help of a graph coupling argument [12]
(see the full version [6] for the detailed proof).
Corollary 1. For graph Gq under Kn = ω(1) and Kn
2
Pn
=
o(1), with some sequence βn defined by
pe,q =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ βn
n
(6)
for some positive integer k, and with δ denoting the minimum
degree of Gq, it holds that
lim
n→∞
P[δ ≥ k] =


e−
e−β
∗
(k−1)! , if lim
n→∞
βn = β
∗ ∈ (−∞,∞),
1, if lim
n→∞
βn = ∞,
0, if lim
n→∞
βn = −∞.
Remark 2. Corollary 1 presents the asymptotically exact
probability and a zero–one law [10] (a kind of phase transition
[40]) for the event that graph Gq has a minimum node degree
no less than k.
Remark 3. Setting pn to 1 in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we
obtain corresponding results [24] for topological properties
in uniform q-intersection graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn).
Remark 4. In Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, given Kn = ω(1),
we have q < Kn for all n sufficiently large since q does not
scale with n. From Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), it is clear that Kn < Pn for
all n sufficiently large.
B. Practicality of Conditions
We check the practicality of the conditions in Theorem 1
and Corollary 1: Kn = ω(1), Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), and (4)–(6). First,
the condition Kn = ω(1) follows in wireless sensor network
applications [2] since Kn is often logarithmic [2] with n, the
number of sensor nodes in the network. Second, the condition
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) also holds in practice since the key pool size Pn
is expected to be several orders of magnitude larger than Kn
[1], [5]. Finally, (4)–(6) present the range of pe,q that is of
interest.
C. Analogs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
Analogous results to those of Theorem 1 and Corollary
1 can be given with pe,q at all places substituted by pn ·
1
q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q
, due to pe,q = pn ·ps,q from (3) and the replacement
of ps,q by 1q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q given Lemma 1 below. However, extra
conditions have to be added for some results. The details as
well as the proof of Lemma 1 are provided in the full version
[6].
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Fig. 1. A plot of the probability distribution for the number of nodes with
degree h for h = 2, 3 in graph Gq(n,K,P, p) with n = 2, 000, q = 2,
P = 10, 000, K = 36 and p = 0.7.
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Fig. 2. A plot of the probability that graph Gq(n,K,P, p) has a minimum
node degree at least k as a function of K for k = 4 and k = 8 with q = 2,
n = 2, 000, P = 10, 000, and p = 0.8.
Lemma 1. If Kn = ω(1) and Kn2Pn = o(1), then it follow that
ps,q ∼
1
q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q
.
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
To confirm the results in Theorem 1, we now provide nu-
merical experiments in the non-asymptotic regime. As we will
see from the simulation results, the experimental observations
are in agreement with our theoretical findings.
In all experiments, we fix the number of nodes at n = 2, 000
and the key pool size at P = 10, 000. In Figure 1, we
plot the probability distribution for the number of nodes with
degree h in graph Gq(n,K, P, p) for h = 2, 3 from both
the simulation and the analysis, with q = 2, K = 36 and
p = 0.7. On the one hand, for the simulation, we generate
2, 000 independent samples of Gq(n,K, P, p) and record the
count (out of a possible 2, 000) that the number of nodes
with degree h for each h equals a particular non-negative
number M (M is the horizontal axis in Figure 1). Then the
empirical probabilities are obtained by dividing the counts
by 2, 000. On the other hand, we approximate the analytical
curves by the asymptotic results as explained below. Property
(a) of Theorem 1 notes that with the parameter conditions
therein, the number of nodes in Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) with degree
h is asymptotically equivalent in distribution to a Poisson
random variable with mean λn,h = n(h!)−1(npe,q)he−npe,q .
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We derive λn,h by computing the corresponding probability
of pe,q in Gq(n,K, P, p) through
pe,q = p ·
K∑
u=q
[(
K
u
)(
P −K
K − u
)/(
P
K
)]
(7)
given (1–3) and P > 2K . Then for each h, we plot a Poisson
distribution with mean λn,h as the curve corresponding to
the analysis. We observe that the curves generated from the
simulation and those obtained by the analysis are close to each
other, confirming the result on asymptotic Poisson distribution
in property (a) of Theorem 1.
In Figure 2, we depict the probability that graph
Gq(n,K, P, p) has a minimum node degree at least k from
both the simulation and the analysis, for k = 4 and k = 8
with q = 2 and p = 0.8 and K varying from 29 to 36
(we still set n = 2, 000 and P = 10, 000). Similar to
the experiments for Figure 1 above, we also generate 2, 000
independent samples of graph Gq(n,K, P, p) and record the
count that the minimum degree of graph Gq(n,K, P, p) is no
less than k; and the empirical probability of Gq(n,K, P, p)
having a minimum degree at least k is derived by averaging
over the 2, 000 experiments. The analytical curves in Figure 2
are also approximated by the asymptotical results as follows.
First, we compute the corresponding probability of pe,q in
Gq(n,K, P, p) through (7). Then based on (6), we determine
β through pe,q = lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+βn . Then with an approx-
imation to the asymptotical results in Corollary 1, we plot
the analytical curves by considering that the minimum degree
of Gq(n,K, P, p) is at least k with probability e−
e−β
(k−1)!
. The
observation that the curves generated from the simulation and
the analytical curves are close to each other is in accordance
with Corollary 1.
V. RELATED WORK
Erdo˝s and Rényi [52] propose the random graph model
G(n, pn) defined on a node set with size n such that an
edge between any two nodes exists with probability pn in-
dependently of all other edges. For graph G(n, pn), Erdo˝s and
Rényi [52] derive the asymptotically exact probabilities for
connectivity the property that the minimum degree is at least
1, by proving first that the number of isolated nodes converges
to a Poisson distribution as n → ∞. Later, they extend the
results to general k in [53], obtaining the asymptotic Poisson
distribution for the number of nodes with certain degree and
the asymptotically exact probabilities for k-connectivity and
the event that the minimum degree is at least k, where k-
connectivity is defined as the property that the network remains
connected in spite of the removal of any (k−1) nodes3. Since
its introduction, graph G(n, pn) has been widely investigated
[25]–[35].
For graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn), Bloznelis et al. [7] demonstrate
that a connected component with at at least a constant fraction
of n emerges asymptotically when the edge probability pe,q ex-
ceeds 1/n. Bloznelis and Łuczak [21] have recently considered
3k-connectivity throughout this paper means k-vertex-connectivity [51].
connectivity and perfect matching. Still in Gq(n,Kn, Pn),
Bloznelis et al. [20] investigate assortativity and clustering,
while for asymptotic node degree distribution, Bloznelis [19]
analyzes clustering coefficient and the degree distribution of a
typical node. We [24] compute the probability distribution for
the minimum node degree. Recently, Bloznelis and Rybarczyk
[22] and we [23] have derived the asymptotically exact proba-
bility of k-connectivity. Several variants or generalizations of
graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) are also considered in the literature [7],
[18]–[20].
When q = 1, for graph G1(n,Kn, Pn) (also referred to
as a random key graph [8], [10], [11] or a uniform random
intersection graph [9], [13]) and some of its variants, a number
of properties have been extensively studied in the literature
including component evolution [43], connectivity [9], [10],
[13], k-connectivity [12], [37], node degree distribution [14]–
[17] and independent sets [41], [42].
In graph G1, Yag˘an [2] presents zero–one laws for connec-
tivity and for the property that the minimum degree is at least
1. We extend Yag˘an’s results to general k for G1 in [3], [4].
Krishnan et al. [8] and Krzywdzin´ski and Rybarczyk [38]
describe results for the probability of connectivity asymptoti-
cally converging to 1 in WSNs employing the q-composite key
predistribution scheme with q = 1 (i.e., the basic Eschenauer–
Gligor key predistribution scheme), not under the on/off
channel model but under the well-known disk model [45]–
[50], where nodes are distributed over a bounded region of a
Euclidean plane, and two nodes have to be within a certain
distance for communication. Simulation results in our work [3]
indicate that for WSNs under the key predistribution scheme
with q = 1, when the on-off channel model is replaced by the
disk model, the performances for k-connectivity and for the
property that the minimum degree is at least k do not change
significantly.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we analyze several topological properties
related to node degree in a wireless sensor network operating
under the q-composite key predistribution scheme with on/off
channels. The network is modeled by the superposition of
an Erdo˝s-Rényi graph on a uniform q-intersection graph.
Numerical simulation is shown to be in agreement with our
theoretical findings.
Two future research directions are as follows. To begin
with, we can consider physical link constraints different
with the on/off channel model, where one candidate is the
aforementioned disk model. Another extension is to derive
the asymptotically exact probability and thus a zero–one law
for k-connectivity in graph Gq. Note that a zero–law for k-
connectivity follows immediately from Corollary 1 since k-
connectivity implies the property of minimum node degree
being at least k. The one–law and the asymptotically exact
probability result will follow if we show that under certain
conditions, the probability that Gq has a minimum node degree
no less than k but is not k-connected converges to 0 as n→∞.
4
Best Student Paper Finalist in 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)
The detailed proofs are presented in the full version [6] (CMU Technical Report CMU-CyLab-14-002).
REFERENCES
[1] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song. Random key predistribution schemes
for sensor networks. In Proc. of IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, May 2003.
[2] O. Yag˘an. Performance of the Eschenauer–Gligor key distribution
scheme under an on/off channel. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, 58(6):3821–3835, June 2012.
[3] J. Zhao, O. Yag˘an, and V. Gligor. k-Connectivity in secure wireless
sensor networks with physical link constraints — the on/off channel
model. Arxiv e-prints, 2012. Available online at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.1531
[4] J. Zhao, O. Yag˘an, and V. Gligor. Secure k-connectivity in wireless
sensor networks under an on/off channel model. In Proc. of IEEE ISIT,
pages 2790–2794, 2013.
[5] L. Eschenauer and V. Gligor. A key-management scheme for distributed
sensor networks. In Proc. of ACM CCS, 2002.
[6] J. Zhao, O. Yag˘an, and V. Gligor. Topological properties of wireless
sensor networks under the q-composite key predistribution scheme
with unreliable links. Technical Report CMU-CyLab-14-002, CyLab,
Carnegie Mellon University, January 2014. Available online at
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab14002.pdf
[7] M. Bloznelis, J. Jaworski, and K. Rybarczyk. Component evolution in
a secure wireless sensor network. Netw., 53:19–26, January 2009.
[8] B. Krishnan, A. Ganesh, and D. Manjunath. On connectivity thresholds
in superposition of random key graphs on random geometric graphs. In
Proc. of IEEE ISIT, pages 2389–2393, 2013.
[9] K. Rybarczyk. Diameter, connectivity and phase transition of the
uniform random intersection graph. Discrete Mathematics, 311, 2011.
[10] O. Yag˘an and A. M. Makowski. Zero–one laws for connectivity
in random key graphs. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
58(5):2983–2999, May 2012.
[11] V. Gligor, A. Perrig, and J. Zhao. Brief encounters with a random key
graph. In Proc. of Security Protocols Workshop (SPW) 2009. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), volume 7028, 2013.
[12] K. Rybarczyk. Sharp threshold functions for the random intersection
graph via a coupling method. Electr. Journal of Combinatorics, 18:36–
47, 2011.
[13] S. R. Blackburn and S. Gerke. Connectivity of the uniform random
intersection graph. Discrete Mathematics, 309(16), August 2009.
[14] J. Jaworski, M. Karon´ski, and D. Stark. The degree of a typical vertex
in generalized random intersection graph models. Discrete Mathematics,
306(18):2152 – 2165, 2006.
[15] M. Deijfen and W. Kets. Random intersection graphs with tunable
degree distribution and clustering. Probability in the Engineering and
Informational Sciences, 23:661–674, 2009.
[16] M. Bloznelis and J. Damarackas. Degree distribution of an inho-
mogeneous random intersection graph. The Electronic Journal of
Combinatorics, 20(3):P3, 2013.
[17] D. Stark. The vertex degree distribution of random intersection graphs.
Random Structures & Algorithms, 24(3):249–258, 2004.
[18] M. Bradonjic´, A. Hagberg, N. W. Hengartner, and A. G. Percus.
Component evolution in general random intersection graphs. In WAW,
pages 36–49, 2010.
[19] M. Bloznelis. Degree and clustering coefficient in sparse random
intersection graphs. The Annals of Applied Probability, 23(3):1254–
1289, 2013.
[20] M. Bloznelis, J. Jaworski, and V. Kurauskas. Assortativity and clustering
of sparse random intersection graphs. Electronic Journal of Probability,
18(38):1–24, 2013.
[21] M. Bloznelis and T. Łuczak. Perfect matchings in random intersection
graphs. Acta Mathematica Hungarica, 138(1-2):15–33, 2013.
[22] M. Bloznelis and K. Rybarczyk. k-Connectivity of uniform s-
intersection graphs. Discrete Mathematics, vol. 333, no. 0, pp. 94–100,
2014.
[23] J. Zhao, O. Yag˘an, and V. Gligor. On k-connectivity and minimum
vertex degree in random s-intersection graphs. 2014. Available online
at http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/junzhao/papers/s-int-k-con.pdf
[24] J. Zhao, O. Yag˘an, and V. Gligor. Results on vertex degree and k-
connectivity in uniform s-intersection graphs. Technical Report CMU-
CyLab-14-004, CyLab, Carnegie Mellon University, January 2014.
Available online at
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab14004.pdf
[25] E. Beer, J. A. Fill, S. Janson, and E. R. Scheinerman. On vertex,
edge, and vertex-edge random graphs. The Electronic Journal of
Combinatorics, 18(1):P110, 2011.
[26] P. Beame, J. Culberson, D. Mitchell, and C. Moore. The resolution
complexity of random graph k-colorability. The Electronic Journal of
Combinatorics, 153(1):25–47, 2005.
[27] A. Frieze and P. Loh. Rainbow hamilton cycles in random graphs.
Random Structures & Algorithms, 44(3): 328–354, 2014.
[28] A. Johansson, J. Kahn and V. Vu. Factors in random graphs. Random
Structures & Algorithms, 33(1): 1–28, 2008.
[29] F. Chung and L. Lu. The Diameter of Sparse Random Graphs. Advances
in Applied Mathematics, 26(4): 257–279, 2001.
[30] A. Flaxman, A. Frieze, and J. Vera. Adversarial deletion in a scale free
random graph process. In ACM SODA, pages 287–292, 2005.
[31] A. Bonato, G. Hahn, and C. Wang. The Cop density of a graph.
Contributions to Discrete Mathematics, 2(2): 133–144, 2007.
[32] D. Gamarnik and M. Sudan. Limits of local algorithms over sparse ran-
dom graphs. In Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science conference
(ITCS), 2014.
[33] J. Ding, J. H. Kim, E. Lubetzky, and Y. Peres. Anatomy of a young
giant component in the random graph. Random Structures & Algorithms,
39(2):139–178, 2011.
[34] J. Zhao. Minimum node degree and k-connectivity in wireless networks
with unreliable links. In Proc. of IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory (ISIT), 2014.
[35] B. Pittel and N. C. Wormald. Counting connected graphs inside-out.
Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series B, 93(2):127 – 172, 2005.
[36] M. Penrose. Connectivity of soft random geometric graphs. ArXiv e-
prints, 2013. Available online at http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.3897v1.
[37] J. Zhao, O. Yag˘an, and V. Gligor. On the strengths of connectivity and
robustness in general random intersection graphs. In IEEE Conference
on Decision and Control (CDC), 2014.
[38] K. Krzywdzin´ski and K. Rybarczyk. Geometric graphs with randomly
deleted edges — connectivity and routing protocols. Mathematical
Foundations of Computer Science, 6907:544–555, 2011.
[39] B. Bollobás and A. D. Scott. Intersections of graphs. Journal of Graph
Theory, 66(4):261–282, 2011.
[40] C. Borgs, J. Chayes, R. Hofstad, G. Slade, and J. Spencer. Random
subgraphs of finite graphs: III. The phase transition for the n-cube.
Combinatorica, 26(4):395–410, 2006.
[41] S. Nikoletseas, C. Raptopoulos, and P. Spirakis. Large independent sets
in general random intersection graphs. Theororetical Computer Science,
406(3):215–224, Oct. 2008.
[42] K. Rybarczyk. Constructions of independent sets in random intersection
graphs. Theoretical Computer Science, 524(0):103 – 125, 2014.
[43] M. Bradonjic´, A. Hagberg, N. W. Hengartner, N. Lemons, and A. G.
Percus. The phase transition in inhomogeneous random intersection
graphs. Arxiv e-prints, 2013. Available online at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.7320.
[44] S. Janson, T. Łuczak, and A. Rucin´ski. Random graphs. Wiley-
Interscience Series on Discrete Mathematics and Optimization, 2000.
[45] M. Bradonjic´ and I. Saniee. Bootstrap percolation on random geometric
graphs. Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences,
28(2):169–181, 2014.
[46] M. Bradonjic´, R. Elsässer, T. Friedrich, T. Sauerwald, and A. Stauffer.
Efficient broadcast on random geometric graphs. In Proc. of SODA,
pages 1412–1421, 2010.
[47] P. Gupta and P. R. Kumar. Critical power for asymptotic connectivity
in wireless networks. In Proc. IEEE CDC, pages 547–566, 1998.
[48] A. Goel, S. Rai, and B. Krishnamachari. Monotone properties of
random geometric graphs have sharp thresholds. The Annals of Applied
Probability, 15(4):2535–2552, 2005.
[49] Y. Peres, A. Sinclair, P. Sousi, and A. Stauffer. Mobile geometric graphs:
detection, coverage and percolation. Probability Theory and Related
Fields, 156(1-2):273–305, 2013.
[50] Q. Wang, X. Wang, and X. Lin. Mobility increases the connectivity
of k-hop clustered wireless networks. In Proc. of ACM MobiCom, pp.
121–132, 2009.
[51] K. Censor-Hillel, M. Ghaffari, and F. Kuhn. A new perspective on vertex
connectivity. In Proc. of SODA, pages 546–561, 2014.
[52] P. Erdo˝s and A. Rényi. On random graphs, I. Publicationes Mathemat-
icae (Debrecen), 6:290–297, 1959.
[53] P. Erdo˝s and A. Rényi. On the strength of connectedness of random
graphs. Acta Math. Acad. Sci. Hungar, pages 261–267, 1961.
5
